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16 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
17 **COUNTY OF SAN MATEO**

18
19 JOHN DOE, a minor, represented by his
20 court-appointed guardian *ad litem*,
CHARLES JONAS,

21 Plaintiff,

22 v.

23 ROBLOX CORPORATION; DISCORD
24 INC.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

25 Defendants.
26
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Case No.: 25-CIV-01193

**PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT ROBLOX CORPORATION'S
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
AND STAY PROCEEDINGS**

Date: May 2, 2025

Time: 9:00 a.m.

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1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 Defendant Roblox Corporation (“Roblox”) markets its gaming platform as a safe online
3 environment for children. The reality is far different—and Roblox knows it. Each year, Roblox
4 quietly tallies up thousands of reports of children being groomed, threatened, sexually exploited,
5 kidnapped, raped, and otherwise assaulted by predators who use Roblox to get easy access to kids.¹
6 These crimes are horrific and happen on a daily basis.² Yet, shockingly, none of this stops Roblox
7 from deploying millions in marketing to lure children to its fast-growing and lucrative platform.
8 Plaintiff John Doe (“John”) was one of those children.

9 On February 12, 2025, as a 13-year-old child, John bravely filed this lawsuit, detailing how
10 the purposeful design and operation of Roblox, together with the company’s fraudulent claims of
11 safety, allowed a pedophile to identify, contact, groom, and eventually subject John to criminal
12 sexual exploitation.³ (Compl. ¶¶ 205-11, 219-31.) In response, Roblox has filed a motion to deprive
13 John of his day in court and instead force him to pursue his claims in a confidential arbitration
14 proceeding. Roblox’s motivation is simple: to strip John of his right to a jury trial and keep its
15 abhorrent conduct, which enabled and facilitated John’s assault, under wraps.

16 The purported basis for Roblox’s motion is the arbitration provision in the May 2023 Terms
17 of Use (“Terms”) in effect when John’s father created John’s Roblox account. That provision has
18 no application to John’s claims and cannot block his case from proceeding.

19 As Roblox well knows, John himself never expressly assented to the Terms. It was his father
20 who (supposedly) agreed to them. But John’s father’s agreement cannot make *John* a party to the
21 Term’s arbitration provision. Under the law, a parent may not bind a child to arbitrate claims that
22 arise under a contract like the one at issue here. Even if the agreement by John’s father could make
23

24
25 ¹ According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, reports of suspected child
26 exploitation on Roblox have surged in recent years from 675 reports in 2019 to 13,316 in 2023.
(Compl. ¶ 125.)

27 ²As one journalist recently reported, Roblox has a “pedophile problem” of its own creation. Olivia
28 Carville, *Roblox’s Pedophile Problem*, Bloomberg Businessweek (July 23, 2024),
<https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-roblox-pedophileproblem/>.

³ On February 25, 2025, John moved for trial preference.

1 John a party to the arbitration agreement, John expressly disaffirmed any agreement to arbitrate
2 before filing this suit. Under these circumstances, the law is clear: John, a minor child who has
3 disaffirmed any supposed agreement to arbitrate, cannot be forced into secret arbitration. That
4 should end the matter.

5 Rather than accept the clear import of the law, Roblox insists John can be bound as a
6 *nonparty* to the arbitration agreement. It claims that because John gained so many “benefits” from
7 using Roblox’s platform, he cannot now complain that Roblox is trying to force him to comply with
8 an arbitration provision to which he did not agree. Roblox’s argument is astounding—and wrong.
9 For obvious reasons, courts will not close their doors to a person who did not agree to forgo his right
10 to bring suit. And while there are narrow exceptions to that well-established rule, Roblox fails to
11 show that any of them are present here.

12 This Court is the proper forum for John’s claims. The Court should deny Roblox’s motion
13 and allow the judicial process to move forward.

14 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

15 In the spring of 2023, John’s father created a Roblox account for John so that he could play
16 games on the platform. Around the same time, John asked his parents if he could create an account
17 on Defendant Discord Inc.’s (“Discord”) platform so that he could chat with friends. His parents
18 agreed. Within months, John’s life was turned upside down. While playing what was supposed to
19 be a children’s game on Roblox called Pet Simulator, he was identified and targeted by a repeat-
20 offender child predator. This predator used Roblox then Discord to aggressively groom John and
21 coerce him into sending nude images of himself —offering Roblox’s virtual currency “Robux” as
22 payment. The predator then offered John \$100 in Robux in exchange for sex. He convinced John to
23 provide his home address, arranged to meet John in person near his house, and threatened John when
24 he failed to show up, reminding John that he knew his address. None of this would have happened
25 had Defendants disclosed the dangers of their platforms and invested in basic safety features to
26 protect against exactly the kind of exploitation that John and thousands of other kids have suffered.

27 Shortly after, John’s parents discovered that John was being sexually exploited and alerted
28 the police. The police executed a search warrant at the predator’s home, seizing multiple devices

1 and discovering Robux gift cards and information for a Discord account. The police learned that the
2 predator was already facing charges in another case for sexually exploiting a minor, and authorities
3 now believe he similarly exploited at least 26 other children.

4 Terrified that the predator knew where they lived, John and his family uprooted their lives
5 and moved across the country. This meant selling the family home they loved and leaving the school
6 where John was excelling.

7 Due to the sexual exploitation he experienced on Defendants’ platforms, John has suffered,
8 and continues to suffer, life-altering psychological and emotional injuries. He lives with deep
9 humiliation, shame, fear, and a profound loss of trust, safety, and innocence. His new school has
10 referred him to a program that assists students with mental health disorders, including depression,
11 anxiety, and suicidality. John undergoes weekly psychiatric counseling and is prescribed a host of
12 medications. His life will never be the same.

13 On February 12, 2025, John filed this lawsuit against Roblox and Discord. Before doing so,
14 his counsel sent the company a Notice of Disaffirmance, signed and dated by John, disaffirming on
15 the grounds of his minority “any written contract I may have entered at any time whereby Roblox
16 Corporation sought to bind me to its Terms of Use, which included forced arbitration provisions.”
17 (Roblox Ex. A.) John also disaffirmed “any changes to the Roblox Terms of Use that have occurred
18 after any written contract I may have entered with Roblox Corporation.” (*Id.*)

19 **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

20 Contrary to Roblox’s suggestion, the “federal policy favoring arbitration” is not intended to
21 put a thumb on the scale in favor of arbitration agreements. Rather, the “federal policy is about
22 treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration.” (See *Morgan v.*
23 *Sundance, Inc.* (2022) 596 U.S. 411, 418; see also *Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters*
24 (2010) 561 U.S. 287, 302 (explaining that the FAA is simply meant “to place arbitration agreements
25 on the same footing as other contracts”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).) The same
26 is true of California’s policy concerning arbitration. (See *Young v. Horizon West, Inc.* (2013) 220
27 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128 (emphasizing that “the right to arbitration depends on a contract”); *Eng’rs*
28

1 & *Architects Ass’n v. Comty. Dev. Dep’t* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 (“There is no public policy
2 favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.”).)

3 In determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, it is critical that courts “apply
4 ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” *Fleming v. Oliphant Fin., LLC*
5 (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

6 Roblox has moved to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure § 1280, et seq. The
7 court must determine whether “an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (CCP § 1281.2.)
8 Because “the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the
9 petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (*Theresa*
10 *D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC* (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 18, 24 (citation and internal quotation marks
11 omitted). When a party opposing a motion raises a defense to enforcement, “that party bears the
12 burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact
13 necessary to its defense.” (*Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp.* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

14 **ARGUMENT**

15 **I. John Is Not Bound by the Arbitration Agreement.**

16 **A. John Cannot Be Forced to Arbitrate as a Party to the Arbitration Provision.**

17 Roblox’s Terms purport to bind any “User,” including a minor child. The arbitration
18 provision, in particular, seeks to compel a “User” to arbitrate their claims. Under the agreement’s
19 plain terms, John, not his father, is the only possible User here and thus the only possible party to
20 the arbitration agreement. But John never affirmatively assented to any of Roblox’s Terms,
21 including its forced arbitration provision. And, to the extent any agreement by John to arbitrate was
22 arguably created, John expressly disaffirmed it. Those undisputed facts, by themselves, resolve
23 Roblox’s Motion.

24 Seeking to avoid that result, Roblox claims that because John’s *father* assented to the Terms
25 when he created John’s account, John’s father is the party to the Terms and thus the arbitration
26 agreement. (See Roblox Mem. 15, citing Roblox Ex. B § 1(a) (“[b]y permitting a Minor User to use
27 the Services, the Guardian of the Minor becomes subject to these User Terms and any other
28 applicable Roblox Terms”). According to Roblox, John is only a beneficiary of his father’s

1 agreement to the Terms. Roblox says that as a beneficiary, John is bound by Terms, including the
2 arbitration provision, and that as a nonparty, he has no power to disaffirm that provision.

3 Roblox’s position makes no sense. The clear intent of Roblox’s Terms is to bind “Users” of
4 its services. The Terms are “a legally binding agreement between *Users* and Roblox,” that apply to
5 the “*User* and Roblox *only*.” (Roblox Ex. B, Introduction, § 17(a) (emphases added).) The
6 arbitration provision, in particular, creates rights and obligations only for “Users” bringing claims
7 based on their use of Roblox. (See, e.g., Roblox Ex. B § 16 (xiv) (“User and Roblox agree that
8 neither of us will assert a claim against the other as a class action, class arbitration, or in any other
9 similar representative capacity.”) John’s father is not a User and he is not the one bringing claims
10 against Roblox. John is.⁴ And the Terms are *not* a legally binding agreement between a
11 “Guardian”—i.e., the “parent or legal guardian of a Minor User,” like John’s father—and Roblox.
12 (See Roblox Ex. C (defining “Guardian”).) Thus, the only possible party to the arbitration provision
13 is John.

14 Roblox might argue that when establishing John’s account, his father agreed to the Terms
15 *on behalf of* John. But even if that occurred, John still could not be forced to arbitrate. As explained
16 below, courts do not permit parents to bind children to arbitration other than in contracts that
17 “implicate a parent’s fundamental duty to provide for the health and care of the child.” (*Berg v.*
18 *Traylor*, (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 809.) A contract to play online games clearly does not fit that
19 description. Moreover, as noted, John expressly disaffirmed any agreement to arbitrate he arguably
20 had—something that he, as a minor child, was clearly entitled to do. (See Family Code § 6710
21 (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed before majority
22 or within a reasonable time afterwards”); *Berg v. Traylor*, *supra*, 148 Cal.App.4th, at p. 819
23
24

25 ⁴ “Users” are “[e]veryone who uses the Services,” and “Services” are “all of the various features
26 and services, like websites, applications, forums and the Platform, which Roblox makes available
27 to Users to allow Users to play, create and connect.” (Roblox Ex. C.) Users include “Minor
28 Users,” as simply a subset of Users. (See Roblox Ex. C (defining “Minor Users” as “[a] User
under the age of 18 (or as applicable and to the extent lower, the age of majority in their
jurisdiction”).)

1 (holding that minor plaintiff was entitled to disaffirm contract because he was a “principal” to the
2 contract rather than a “third party beneficiary”).

3 **B. John Is Not Bound by the Arbitration Agreement as a Nonsignatory.**

4 Roblox knows that if it treats John as a party to the Terms, its motion will fail since John, a
5 minor, expressly disaffirmed any agreement to arbitrate. So Roblox pivots to insist John is a
6 “nonsignatory” to the Terms, who can be bound because his father agreed to arbitration. That
7 argument ignores the clear rule that one who is not a party to an arbitration agreement cannot be
8 forced to comply with it. (*Pillar Project AG v. Payward Ventures* (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 671, 675.)
9 While that rule has narrow exceptions, Roblox has not come close to showing they apply here.

10 **1. John Is Not a Third-Party Beneficiary.**

11 John is not a third-party beneficiary to the Terms, no matter how Roblox tries to spin it. For
12 John to be a third-party beneficiary to the Terms, he must have the right to enforce the Terms against
13 Roblox. (Code Civ. § 1559 (“A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be
14 enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.”).) But in the Terms, Roblox
15 expressly forecloses John from seeking to enforce them: “Nothing in the Roblox Terms will be
16 deemed to confer any rights or benefits on a third party (other than Apple as noted in the ‘Notice
17 Regarding Apple’ section).” (Roblox Ex. B § 19(a).) “Nothing” means nothing, and the Terms are
18 clear that the only third-party beneficiary is Apple. (See Roblox Ex. B § 17(a) (“Apple and Apple’s
19 subsidiaries are third-party beneficiaries of the Roblox Terms, and when User accepts the Roblox
20 Terms, Apple will have the right . . . to enforce the Terms against Users as a third-party
21 beneficiary.”).)

22 Contract law is clear: because John would have no right to enforce the Terms against Roblox,
23 he is not and cannot be treated as a third-party beneficiary. (See *Comer v. Micor* (9th Cir. 2006) 436
24 F.3d 1098, 1102 (holding that plaintiff was not a third-party beneficiary to contract with arbitration
25 clause because he “cannot be bound to the terms of a contract he didn’t sign and is not even entitled
26 to enforce”); *Matthau v. Superior Court* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 593, 603 (same).) Had Roblox
27 intended for minor users to be third-party beneficiaries, it could have provided for that in its Terms—
28 as it did with Apple. The fact that Roblox specifically identified just one party—Apple—as a third-

1 party beneficiary defeats its after-the-fact effort to place John in that category. Put simply, John
2 would have no right to compel Roblox to arbitrate his claims. That being the case, Roblox cannot
3 force arbitration on John.

4 Even if John were a third-party beneficiary to the Terms (he is not), he still would not be
5 bound by the Terms. It was indisputably John’s father who supposedly signed the Terms. A parent
6 cannot bind his child to an arbitration agreement in a contract unless the parent entered the contract
7 as part of his “right and duty to provide for the care of the child.” (*Doyle v. Giuliucci* (1965) 62
8 Cal.2d 606, 609.) The Court should reject Roblox’s attempts to extend this principle from *Doyle* to
9 a contract pertaining to internet video games.

10 While Roblox relies extensively on *Doyle*, the case is plainly distinguishable. In *Doyle*, the
11 Court considered whether a parent had the authority “to bind his child to arbitrate claims arising
12 under a health care contract of which the child is a beneficiary.” (*Id.* at 698.) There, a father entered
13 a contract with a medical group to provide care for him and his dependents. After his daughter sued
14 the medical group for malpractice, the group moved to compel the case to arbitration under the
15 contract. Although the daughter had disaffirmed the contract, the court concluded that minor
16 disaffirmance “does not apply to contracts between adults and is therefore not controlling on the
17 question of a parent’s power to bind his child to arbitrate by entering into a contract of which the
18 child is a third-party beneficiary.” (*Ibid.*) The “crucial question” therefore was “whether the power
19 to enter into a contract for medical care that binds the child to arbitrate any disputes arising
20 thereunder is implicit in a parent’s right and duty to provide for the care of his child.” (*Ibid.*)
21 Answering yes, the court found “compelling reasons for recognizing that power.” (*Ibid.*) Because
22 minors can disaffirm their own contracts for medical services, the Court explained, medical groups
23 are unlikely to contract with them, and so minors “can be assured of the benefits of group medical
24 services only if parents can contract on their behalf.” (*Ibid.*) For these reasons, the Court held that,
25 in the context of a parent’s contract for medical services for a child, the parent has the authority to
26 bind the child to the arbitration agreement in that contract.

27 Numerous courts have since confirmed that this decades-old decision is limited to arbitration
28 agreements in contracts that a parent entered pursuant to their “right and duty to provide for the care

1 estoppel is that “[w]hen a plaintiff brings a claim *which relies on contract terms* against a defendant,
2 the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that
3 agreement.” (*Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC* (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 18 (quoting *JSM*
4 *Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1239 (emphasis in original)); see
5 also *Pillar Project, supra*, 64 Cal.App.5th, at p. 678 (explaining that “the plaintiff’s actual
6 dependence on the underlying contract” is “always the sine qua non of an appropriate situation for
7 applying equitable estoppel” (citation and internal quotations omitted)).) That makes sense because
8 “[f]airness compels an estoppel when one sues on an agreement but attempts to avoid certain of its
9 terms—such as an arbitration clause.” (*Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co.*
10 (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1072.)

11 Here, John’s claims against Roblox in no way “rely on contract terms.” Tellingly, Roblox
12 does not even attempt to assert that John’s claims seek to enforce the Terms or depend on them in
13 any way. Nor could it. John brings claims for fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation and for
14 negligent misrepresentation. The specific misrepresentations that underly these claims come not
15 from the Terms but from the statements that Roblox made in various public statements, including
16 parts of its website, falsely assuring parents that its platform is safe for their children. (See Compl.
17 ¶¶ 237(a)-(h), 258(a)-(h).) John also asserts numerous claims sounding in negligence and strict
18 liability, which all allege that Roblox violated its duty to John in developing, designing, and
19 operating its platform. (See *id.* ¶¶ 268-406.) Equitable estoppel is inapplicable because John’s
20 “allegations reveal no duty, no claim of any violation of any duty, obligation, or term or condition
21 imposed by” the Terms. (*Goldman v. KPMG, LLP* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 230.) Simply put,
22 John’s claims are “fully viable without reference” to the Terms. (*Id.*)

23 Notwithstanding all this, Roblox claims that equitable estoppel applies because “Plaintiff
24 knowingly sought the benefits made possible by the 2023 Terms: access to and use of the Roblox
25 platform.” (Roblox Mem. 17.) Roblox’s argument is effectively this: even though John’s legal
26 claims do not rely or depend on the Terms in any way, John should be compelled to arbitration
27 because he may have enjoyed some good times on Roblox until things turned bad.

28

1 This position finds no support in California law. Instead, as Roblox’s own cited authority
2 confirms, to invoke estoppel and compel John to arbitrate, Roblox would have to show that John’s
3 legal claims rely or depend on the Terms. Take *Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. SMG*
4 *Holdings, Inc.* (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 834, on which Roblox principally relies. In that insurance
5 coverage dispute, Future Farmers of America licensed the use of a convention center for its annual
6 convention from property manager, SMG Holdings. As part of the license, Future Farmers obtained
7 an insurance policy from Philadelphia Insurance for itself that also covered SMG. An attendee was
8 injured at the event and sued Future Farmers and SMG. SMG tendered its defense to Philadelphia
9 Insurance, which rejected the claim and moved to compel arbitration of the dispute under the
10 insurance policy that it issued Future Farmers. The court granted the motion based on equitable
11 estoppel because SMG *sought to enforce the policy* that itself contained the arbitration provision.
12 The court explained that “it defies logic to require a named insured demanding coverage to submit
13 coverage disputes to arbitration, while freeing from that obligation an unnamed insured demanding
14 the same coverage.” (*Id.* at 842-843.) This case is a textbook application of equitable estoppel in
15 which a nonsignatory brought a claim based on some of a contract’s terms but sought to avoid the
16 arbitration clause contained in the same contract.

17 The same is true of Roblox’s other cases. In *Verge Media Co. v. MacCini* (C.D.Cal. 2011),
18 No. 11-05520 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169602, at *44, the court held that equitable estoppel applied
19 because the nonsignatory plaintiffs were suing the signatory defendant “based at least in part on
20 [the] agreement” and were therefore “seeking to enforce and benefit from the rights the agreement
21 confers.” As a result, the court explained, “they must also be held to the concomitant obligations the
22 agreement imposes, and be required to arbitrate with defendants.” (*Id.*) In *Teel v. Aaron’s, Inc.* (M.D.
23 Fla. Mar. 24, 2015) No. 14-640, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37140, at *19-20, the court compelled
24 arbitration of all the plaintiffs’ claims, including those of the minor plaintiffs who were
25 nonsignatories to a lease purchase agreement, because each of the plaintiffs’ six counts—including
26 the counts brought by the minor plaintiffs—“rely on the unsigned lease purchase agreements.” And
27 likewise in *Hofer v. Emley* (N.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 2019) No. 19-02205, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161377,
28 at *19, where the court held that equitable estoppel applied because the nonsignatory plaintiff

1 “knowingly received a direct benefit from the Agreement and seeks to exploit the benefits of the
2 Agreement by alleging breach of a duty that arose from that Agreement.” Far from supporting
3 Roblox’s position, these cases confirm that equitable estoppel does not apply here.

4 **3. Roblox’s Preexisting Relationship Argument Fails.**

5 Lastly, Roblox claims that John is bound to the Terms because of his “preexisting
6 relationship” with his father. (Roblox Mem. 17-18.) But John cannot be bound to the Terms based
7 *solely* on a parent-child relationship. His father must have had the authority to bind him to the
8 Terms—which he did not, as explained above.⁵ (*Cf. Matthau v. Superior Court* (2007) 151
9 Cal.App.4th 593, 600 (explaining that “[a] child is bound by a parent’s contract to arbitrate medical
10 malpractice claims” with a healthcare provider because the “preexisting relationship . . . supports
11 the implied authority of the party to bind the nonsignatory”).

12 Roblox’s cases are not to the contrary. They all simply illustrate the inapplicable *Doyle* rule.
13 In *County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 237, the
14 court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because there was no preexisting
15 relationship that established the implied authority of the signatory to bind the nonsignatory to the
16 arbitration agreement. In doing so, the court highlighted examples of preexisting relationships where
17 such implied authority exists, including when “[m]inors are bound by a parent’s agreement to
18 arbitrate *medical malpractice claims* filed against a healthcare provider.” (*Id.* at 242 (emphasis
19 added).) It emphasized that “[a]ll nonsignatory arbitration cases are grounded in the authority of the
20 signatory to contract for *medical services* on behalf of the nonsignatory—to bind the nonsignatory
21 in some manner.” (*Id.* at 244 (emphasis added).) In *Crowley Maritime Corp., supra*, 158
22 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1070, the court cited *Contra Costra* in noting the “parent-child relationship” as a
23 preexisting relationship that “gives the party to the agreement authority to bind the nonsignatory.”

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26 ⁵ At least one court has concluded that a preexisting relationship is just another way of showing
27 that the nonsignatory plaintiff is “*suing on a contract*” because the preexisting relationship simply
28 shows that the plaintiff “can state a valid claim based on the contract” because of “a legal
relationship with a signatory of the contract.” (See *JSM Tuscany v. Superior Court, supra*, 193
Cal.App.4th at 1239-40 & n.20 (emphasis in original).)

1 Additionally, in *Yeh v. Tesla, Inc.* (N.D.Cal. Oct. 12, 2023), No. 23-01704, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2 184083, consistent with *Doyle*'s narrow holding that a parent can bind a child to an arbitration
3 agreement in a contract the parent entered for the care of a child, the court found that the father's
4 "purchase was, at least in part, to benefit and provide care for his child."⁶

5 In short, Roblox cannot establish that John is bound by the Terms as a nonsignatory.

6 **C. The Arbitration Agreement Cannot Be Enforced Because It is Unconscionable.**

7 Even if John were bound to the Terms (he is not), the arbitration provision cannot be
8 enforced because it is unconscionable. Roblox calls the arbitration agreement "Consumer Friendly,"
9 but nothing could be further from the truth. The agreement imposes terms that are unfair, one-sided,
10 and designed to give Roblox an unfair advantage and to deter users, particular children, from
11 pursuing claims.

12 Under the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, an agreement to arbitrate is valid,
13 enforceable, and irrevocable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
14 of any contract." (9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) Such grounds include
15 unconscionability. (*Ramirez v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 529.) A contract is
16 unconscionable if "one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and
17 the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party." (*Oto, L.L.C. v. Kho*
18 (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.)

19 Unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element. Procedural
20 unconscionability "addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on
21 oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power," whereas substantive unconscionability
22 "pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessment of whether they are overly
23 harsh or one-sided." (*Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC* (2012) 55
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26 ⁶ Roblox also relies on *Chan v. Charter Commc'ns Holding Co.* (C.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2015), No. 15-
27 0886, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199825, but the court's cursory analysis should be not given any
28 weight. In fact, the court in *In re Ring LLC Privacy Litigation, supra*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118461, at *27, rejected *Chan* because it failed to "address[] the distinction between contracts for
medical services and adhesion contracts for consumer goods."

1 Cal.4th 223, 246.) Both elements must be present, though not “to the same degree,” and are
2 evaluated on a “sliding scale” under which “the more substantively oppressive [a] term, the less
3 evidence of procedural unconscionability is required, and vice versa.” (*Ramirez v. Charter*
4 *Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16 Cal.5th, at p. 493 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).)

5 The arbitration agreement in the Terms is procedurally unconscionable. It is part of a contract
6 of adhesion—i.e., “a standardized contract offered by a party with superior bargaining power on a
7 take-it-or-leave-it basis.” (*Oto, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra*, 8 Cal.5th, at p. 126 (citation and internal
8 quotation marks omitted).) Although “adhesion alone generally indicates only a low degree of
9 procedural unconscionability,” (*Ramirez v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16 Cal.5th, at p. 492),
10 the significant substantive unconscionability of the agreement renders it unconscionable.

11 First, the arbitration agreement drastically shortens the statute-of-limitations for John to
12 bring his claims. Because John is a minor, the statutes-of-limitations on his claims are tolled until
13 he turns 18 years old. (See, e.g., N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-21 (tolling statute of limitations until minors
14 reach the age of majority); Code Civ., § 352(a) (same).) Under the Terms, however, John must bring
15 any cause of action “WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES OR IT
16 IS PERMANENTLY BARRED.” (Roblox Ex. B § 19(a).) The one-year limitations period in the
17 Terms precludes countless Minor Users from pursuing claims against Roblox in the only forum that
18 the Terms purport is available to them: arbitration. The one-year period imposed by the Terms is
19 thus substantively unconscionable because it is “so unreasonable” as to “show imposition or undue
20 advantage.” (*Jackson v. S.A.W. Entm’t, Ltd.* (N.D.Cal. 2009) 629 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1028 (quoting
21 *Moreno v. Sanchez* (2003) Cal.App.4th 1415, 1430).) Courts regularly hold that contractual
22 limitations periods far less unreasonable are substantively unconscionable. (See, e.g., *Ramirez v.*
23 *Charter Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16 Cal.5th, at p. 500-02 (finding one-year contractual limitations
24 period unreasonable because plaintiff could have had as many as three years to file a lawsuit);
25 *Pandolfi v. Aviagames, Inc., supra*, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159007, at *37 (finding provision with
26 one-year limitations period substantively unconscionable because plaintiff’s claims had statutory
27 limitations periods of three to four years); *Longboy v. Pinnacle Prop. Mgmt. Servs., LLC* (N.D.Cal.
28 2024) 718 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (same).)

1 Second, the arbitration agreement lacks mutuality. Mutuality is “the paramount
2 consideration” in assessing substantive unconscionability because when it is absent the arbitration
3 agreement may “be described as unfairly one-sided.” (*Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.* (2015)
4 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 241 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).) Here, the arbitration
5 agreement lacks mutuality because “it compels arbitration of the claims more likely to be brought
6 by [John], the weaker party, but exempts from arbitration the types of claims more likely to be
7 brought by [Roblox], the stronger party.” (*Ramirez v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16 Cal.5th,
8 at p. 497 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).) While the arbitration agreement broadly
9 covers “any dispute arising under or relating to the Roblox Terms or the Services” it then carves out
10 the claims most likely to be brought by Roblox and allows the company to bring those claims in
11 court. (Roblox Ex. B § 16(a), (xii).) Specifically, the agreement exempts from arbitration “claims
12 for infringement of patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret rights,” which are claims most likely
13 to be asserted by Roblox. (*Cf. Ramirez*, at p. 498 (holding that exclusion of claims related to
14 intellectual property rights was “more likely to be employer-initiated”).) The agreement also carves
15 out “actions seeking only injunctive relief and no award of attorneys’ fees or costs.” (Roblox Ex. B
16 § 16(xii). As a large company with deep pockets and extensive resources, Roblox is far more likely
17 than Users to bring an action in court for injunctive relief that does not seek attorneys’ fees or costs.
18 In short, the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because Roblox has sought, “through a contract
19 of adhesion” to “impose the arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting that forum for
20 itself.” (*Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.* (2000) 24 Cal.App.4th 83, 89.)

21 Third, the substantive unconscionability of Roblox’s arbitration agreement is amplified
22 by the fact that it applies mostly to children. (See *Ramirez v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16
23 Cal.5th, at p. 495 (“The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are
24 sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.”)
25 The majority of Roblox users are children under 18 years old because Roblox has designed its
26 platform for children. (See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19.) With its arbitration agreement, Roblox seeks to force
27 children to give up rights that are specific to minors and bestowed on them to protect their interests.
28 These rights include extended statutes of limitations and the ability to move for trial preference to

1 obtain an expedited trial date. (See CPP § 36(b).) Indeed, here, Roblox seeks to deprive John of his
2 right to trial preference by moving to compel his claims to arbitration.

3 Given the procedural unconscionability and significant substantive unconscionability of
4 Roblox’s arbitration agreement, the Court should deem the arbitration agreement unenforceable
5 rather than sever the unconscionable provisions. That is because the “central purpose of the
6 agreement is tainted with illegality” in that the agreement is intended and designed to deprive
7 children of their rights and to force them into an inferior forum to pursue their claims. (*Ramirez v.*
8 *Charter Commc’ns, Inc., supra*, 16 Cal.5th, at p. 515.) This unconscionable agreement thus
9 “operate[s] to chill [children] from even pursuing rights.” (See *Pandolfi v. Aviagames, Inc., supra*,
10 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159007, at *42.). The agreement should not be enforced.

11 **II. A Stay Pending Arbitration Is Unnecessary.**

12 John is not bound by the arbitration agreement in the Terms and the agreement is
13 unenforceable in any event. Roblox’s request to stay pending arbitration is moot.

14 **CONCLUSION**

15 For the foregoing reasons, John respectfully requests that this Court deny Roblox’s motion
16 to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings.

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18 Dated: March 31, 2025

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